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Ungarische Revolution von 1956 - Wikipedia



Ungarische Revolution von 1956
Teil des Kalten Krieges
Loch in Flagge - Budapest 1956.jpg
Die Flagge mit einem Loch, in dem das kommunistische Wappen ausgeschnitten wurde, wurde zum Symbol der Revolution
Datum 23. Oktober - 10. November 1956
(2 Wochen und 4 Tage) Zivilrechtliche Handlungen bis Januar 1957
Ergebnis Ergebnis

  • Sowjetischer Sieg

  • Revolution
Kriegstreibende

Sowjetunion


Ungarische Volksrepublik



Ungarische Revolutionäre und Regierungstruppen von Pro-Imre Nagy
Kommandanten und Führer


Stärke


  • 31.550 Truppen

  • 1.130 Panzer [1]

  • Unbekannte Anzahl von Regierungsloyalisten

Unbekannte Anzahl von Soldaten, Milizen und bewaffneten Zivilisten


  • 722 getötete oder vermisste Sowjets

  • 1.540 verwundete Sowjets [2]


  • 2.500–3.000 Tote (gegr.)

  • 13.000 Verwundete (est.) [3]

3.000 getötete Zivilisten [4]

Die Ungarische Revolution von 1956 oder Ungarischer Aufstand von 1956 [5] (Ungarisch: 1956-os forradalom oder 1956-os felkelés ), war eine landesweite Revolution gegen die ungarische Volksrepublik und Die von der Sowjetunion auferlegte Politik dauerte vom 23. Oktober bis zum 10. November 1956. Obwohl sie zu Beginn ihres Bestehens führungslos war, war sie die erste große Bedrohung für die Kontrolle der Sowjetunion, seit die Truppen der UdSSR das Ende der Zweiten Weltkrieg besetzte Nazi-Deutschland aus seinem Gebiet vertrieben hatten.

Der Aufstand begann als Studentenprotest, der Tausende anzog, als sie durch das Zentrum von Budapest zum Parlamentsgebäude marschierten und mit einem Lieferwagen mit Lautsprechern die Straßen riefen. Eine Studentendelegation, die das Funkgebäude betrat, um die Forderungen der Studenten zu verbreiten, wurde festgenommen. Als die Delegation die Freilassung der Delegation forderte, wurden sie von der Staatssicherheitspolizei (ÁVH) (Akronym für Állam Védelmi Hatóság ) aus dem Gebäude beschossen. Ein Student starb und wurde in eine Flagge gehüllt und über der Menge festgehalten. Dies war der Beginn der Revolution. Als sich die Nachrichten verbreiteten, kam es in der Hauptstadt zu Unruhen und Gewalt.

Der Aufstand breitete sich rasch in Ungarn aus und die Regierung brach zusammen. Tausende organisierten sich in Milizen und kämpften gegen die ÁVH und die sowjetischen Truppen. Pro-sowjetische Kommunisten und Mitglieder der ÁVH wurden häufig hingerichtet oder inhaftiert, ehemalige politische Gefangene wurden freigelassen und bewaffnet. Radikale improvisierte Arbeiterräte raubten der regierenden ungarischen Arbeiterpartei die Kontrolle der Stadt und forderten politische Veränderungen. Eine neue Regierung löste die ÁVH formell auf, erklärte ihre Absicht, sich aus dem Warschauer Pakt zurückzuziehen, und versprach, freie Wahlen wieder herzustellen. Ende Oktober hatten die Kämpfe fast aufgehört, und die Normalität kehrte zurück.

Das Politbüro erschien zunächst offen für Verhandlungen über einen Abzug der Sowjetkräfte, änderte seine Meinung und begann, die Revolution zu zerschlagen. Am 4. November fiel eine große sowjetische Truppe in Budapest und andere Regionen des Landes ein. Der ungarische Widerstand hielt bis zum 10. November an. In dem Konflikt wurden über 2.500 Ungarn und 700 sowjetische Truppen getötet. 200.000 Ungarn flohen als Flüchtlinge. Massenverhaftungen und Denunziationen dauerten danach noch Monate. Im Januar 1957 hatte die neue von den Sowjets eingesetzte Regierung jede öffentliche Opposition unterdrückt. Diese sowjetischen Aktionen stärkten zwar die Kontrolle über den Ostblock, entfremdeten jedoch viele westliche Marxisten, was zu Aufspaltungen und / oder erheblichen Mitgliedschaftsverlusten für kommunistische Parteien in kapitalistischen Staaten führte.

Die öffentliche Diskussion über die Revolution wurde in Ungarn mehr als 30 Jahre lang unterdrückt. Seit dem Tauwetter der 1980er Jahre wurde es intensiv untersucht und debattiert. Bei der Eröffnung der Dritten Ungarischen Republik im Jahr 1989 wurde der 23. Oktober zum Nationalfeiertag erklärt.




Prelude [ edit ]


Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs war Ungarn Mitglied der Achsenmächte, verbündet mit den Streitkräften des nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, des faschistischen Italiens, Rumäniens und Bulgariens. 1941 beteiligte sich das ungarische Militär an der Besetzung Jugoslawiens und an der Invasion der Sowjetunion. Die Rote Armee konnte die ungarischen und anderen Achsen-Invasoren zurückdrängen und rückte 1944 in Richtung Ungarn vor.

Aus Angst vor einer Invasion begann die ungarische Regierung Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen mit den Alliierten. Diese endeten, als das nationalsozialistische Deutschland einmarschierte und das Land besetzte und die Pro-Axis-Regierung der Nationalen Einheit einrichtete.

Sowohl die in Ungarn stationierten ungarischen als auch die deutschen Truppen wurden später besiegt, als die Sowjetunion Ende 1944 in das Land einmarschierte.


Nachkriegsbesetzung [ edit ]


Gegen Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs besetzte die Sowjetarmee Ungarn, wobei das Land unter den Einflussbereich der Sowjetunion geriet. Unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war Ungarn eine Mehrparteiendemokratie, und die Wahlen 1945 führten zu einer Koalitionsregierung unter Premierminister Zoltán Tildy. Die Ungarische Kommunistische Partei, eine marxistisch-leninistische Gruppe, die den ideologischen Glauben der Sowjetregierung teilte, raubte jedoch ständig kleine Zugeständnisse in einem Prozess namens Salami-Taktik, der den Einfluss der gewählten Regierung aufhob, obwohl sie nur 17% davon erhalten hatte die Abstimmung [6] [7]

Nach den Wahlen von 1945 wurde das Portfolio des Innenministeriums, das die ungarische Staatssicherheitspolizei beaufsichtigte ( Államvédelmi Hatóság später bekannt als ÁVH), wurde von der Unabhängigen Kleinbauernpartei an einen Kandidaten der Kommunistischen Partei übergeben. [8] Die ÁVH verwendete Methoden der Einschüchterung, gefälschten Anschuldigungen, Inhaftierung und Folter, um die politische Opposition zu unterdrücken. [9] ] Die kurze Phase der Mehrparteiendemokratie endete, als die Kommunistische Partei mit der Sozialdemokratischen Partei zu einer ungarischen Arbeiterpartei verschmolz, die ihre Candida vertrat Diese Liste wurde 1949 ohne Widerspruch erhoben. Die Volksrepublik Ungarn wurde daraufhin erklärt. [7]

Die Ungarische Volkspartei machte sich daran, die Wirtschaft durch eine radikale Verstaatlichung nach dem sowjetischen Modell in den Sozialismus zu verändern. Schriftsteller und Journalisten waren die ersten, die Kritik an der Regierung und ihrer Politik äußerten und 1955 kritische Artikel veröffentlichten. [10] Bis zum 22. Oktober 1956 hatten Studenten der Technischen Universität die verbotene Studentenvereinigung MEFESZ [11] wiederbelebt und eine Demonstration veranstaltet 23. Oktober, die eine Kette von Ereignissen auslösten, die direkt zur Revolution führen.


Politische Repression und wirtschaftlicher Niedergang [ edit ]


Ungarn wurde ein kommunistischer Staat unter der autoritären Führung von Mátyás Rákosi. [12] Unter der Herrschaft von Rákosi begann die Sicherheitspolizei (ÁVH) eine Reihe von Säuberungen, zuerst innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei, um die Opposition gegen Rákosis Regierung zu beenden. Die Opfer wurden als "Titoisten", "westliche Agenten" oder "Trotzkisten" bezeichnet, da sie ein unerhebliches Verbrechen darstellen, wenn sie im Westen Zeit verbringen, um am spanischen Bürgerkrieg teilzunehmen. Insgesamt wurde etwa die Hälfte aller Parteifunktionäre der mittleren und unteren Ebene - mindestens 7.000 Menschen - gereinigt. [13][14][15]


Mátyás Rákosi spricht in Budapest, 1948

Von 1950 bis 1952 brachte die Sicherheitspolizei Tausende von Menschen zwangsweise nach Erwerb von Eigentum und Wohnraum für die Mitglieder der Arbeiterpartei und Beseitigung der Bedrohung der intellektuellen und bürgerlichen Klasse. Tausende wurden festgenommen, gefoltert, vor Gericht gestellt und in Konzentrationslager eingesperrt, in den Osten deportiert oder hingerichtet, darunter auch der Gründer der ÁVH, László Rajk. [14][16] In einem einzigen Jahr wurden mehr als 26.000 Menschen aus Budapest vertrieben. Arbeitsplätze und Wohnraum waren daher nur sehr schwer zu bekommen. Die Deportierten erlebten im Allgemeinen schreckliche Lebensbedingungen und wurden als Sklavenarbeit in Kollektivfarmen interniert. Viele starben infolge von schlechten Lebensbedingungen und Unterernährung. [15]

Die Regierung von Rákosi hat das ungarische Bildungssystem gründlich politisiert, um die gebildeten Klassen durch eine "arbeitslose Intelligenz" zu ersetzen. [17] Russische Sprachstudie Kommunaler politischer Unterricht wurde bundesweit an Schulen und Universitäten zur Pflicht gemacht. Religiöse Schulen wurden verstaatlicht und die Führer der Kirche wurden durch diejenigen ersetzt, die der Regierung gegenüber loyal waren. [18] 1949 wurde der Führer der ungarischen katholischen Kirche, Kardinal József Mindszenty, verhaftet und wegen Landesverrats zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt. [19] Unter dem ungarischen Rákosi Die Regierung gehörte zu den repressivsten in Europa. [7] [16]

Die ungarische Wirtschaft der Nachkriegszeit litt unter zahlreichen Herausforderungen. Ungarn stimmte zu, Kriegserstattungen in Höhe von 300 Millionen US-Dollar an die Sowjetunion, die Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawien zu zahlen und die sowjetischen Garnisonen zu unterstützen. [20] Die Ungarische Nationalbank schätzte 1946 die Wiedergutmachungskosten mit zwischen 19 und 22 Prozent des Jahres Nationaleinkommen ". [21] Im Jahr 1946 wurde die ungarische Währung stark abgewertet, was zu den höchsten historischen Hyperinflationsraten führte. [22] Die Beteiligung Ungarns an der von der Sowjetunion gesponserten COMECON (Rat der gegenseitigen wirtschaftlichen Unterstützung) verhinderte den Handel mit der Westen oder die Marshall-Plan-Hilfe erhalten [23]

Außerdem begann Rákosi 1950 seinen ersten Fünfjahresplan, der auf dem gleichnamigen Industrieprogramm von Joseph Stalin beruhte, das auf eine Steigerung der Industrieproduktion abzielte um 380%. [13] Wie sein sowjetischer Amtskollege hat der Fünfjahresplan diese ausgefallenen Ziele nie erreicht, was zum Teil auf den lähmenden Effekt der Ausfuhr der meisten Rohstoffe Ungarns zurückzuführen ist Technologie und Technologie für die Sowjetunion sowie Rákosis Säuberungen eines Großteils der früheren Profiklasse. Tatsächlich schwächte der Fünf-Jahres-Plan die bestehende Industriestruktur Ungarns und führte dazu, dass die realen Industrielöhne zwischen 1949 und 1952 um 18% sanken. [13]

Obwohl das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen im ersten Drittel stieg In den fünfziger Jahren sank der Lebensstandard. Große Einkommensabzüge zur Finanzierung von Industrieinvestitionen reduzierten das verfügbare persönliche Einkommen; Missmanagement führte zu chronischem Mangel an Grundnahrungsmitteln, was zu einer Rationierung von Brot, Zucker, Mehl und Fleisch führte. [24] Die obligatorischen Abonnements von Staatsanleihen reduzierten das persönliche Einkommen weiter. Das Nettoergebnis war, dass das verfügbare Realeinkommen von Arbeitnehmern und Arbeitnehmern im Jahr 1952 nur zwei Drittel des Werts von 1938 betrug, während es 1949 zu 90% gewesen war. [25] Diese Policen hatten einen kumulativen negativen Effekt und wurden verstärkt Unzufriedenheit mit der Auslandsverschuldung und wachsende Güterknappheit der Bevölkerung. [26]


Internationale Ereignisse [ edit ]


Imre Nagy (Mitte) im Oktober 1956

Am 5. März 1953, Joseph Stalin starb und leitete eine Phase der gemäßigten Liberalisierung ein, als die meisten kommunistischen Parteien in Europa einen Reformflügel entwickelten. In Ungarn ersetzte der Reformer Imre Nagy als Premierminister Rákosi, "Stalins bester ungarischer Schüler". [27] Rákosi blieb jedoch Generalsekretär der Partei und konnte die meisten Reformen von Nagy untergraben. Im April 1955 hatte er Nagy diskreditiert und sein Amt niedergelegt. [28] Nach Chruschtschows "geheimer Rede" vom Februar 1956, die Stalin und seine Schützlinge verurteilte, [29] wurde Rákosi als Generalsekretär der Partei abgesetzt und durch Ernő Gerő ersetzt am 18. Juli 1956. [30] Radio Free Europe (RFE) strahlte auf Anraten von Ray S. Cline die "geheime Rede" nach Osteuropa aus, die es als einen Weg ansah, "wie ich glaube, [Allen Dulles] zu sagen sagen Sie, "das ganze Sowjetsystem anklagen". " [31]

Am 14. Mai 1955 schuf die Sowjetunion den Warschauer Pakt, der Ungarn an die Sowjetunion und ihre Satellitenstaaten in Mittel- und Osteuropa bindet. Zu den Grundsätzen dieses Bündnisses gehörten "Achtung der Unabhängigkeit und Souveränität der Staaten" und "Nichteinmischung in ihre inneren Angelegenheiten". 19459100 [32]

1955 der österreichische Staatsvertrag und die darauf folgende Erklärung der Neutralität etablierte Österreich als entmilitarisiertes und neutrales Land. [33] Dies weckte die ungarischen Hoffnungen, auch neutral zu werden, und Nagy hatte 1955 "die Möglichkeit in Betracht gezogen, dass Ungarn nach österreichischem Muster einen neutralen Status annimmt". [34] [34]

Im Juni 1956 wurde ein gewaltsamer Aufstand polnischer Arbeiter in Posen von der Regierung niedergeschlagen. Zahlreiche Demonstranten wurden getötet und verwundet. Als Reaktion auf die Forderung der Bevölkerung ernannte die Regierung im Oktober 1956 den kürzlich rehabilitierten reformistischen Kommunisten Władysław Gomułka zum ersten Sekretär der polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei. Er hatte das Mandat, mit der Sowjetregierung Handelskonzessionen und Truppenreduzierungen auszuhandeln. Nach einigen spannenden Verhandlungstagen haben die Sowjets am 19. Oktober endlich den reformistischen Forderungen Gomułkas nachgegeben. [35] Die Nachricht von den Zugeständnissen der Polen, dem polnischen Oktober, ermutigte viele Ungarn, auf ähnliche Zugeständnisse für Ungarn und diese zu hoffen Die Stimmung trug wesentlich zu dem in Ungarn in der zweiten Hälfte des Monats Oktober 1956 herrschenden politischen Klima bei. [36]

Im Kontext des Kalten Krieges war bis 1956 eine grundlegende Spannung aufgetreten in der US-Politik gegenüber Ungarn und dem Ostblock im Allgemeinen. Die Vereinigten Staaten hofften, die europäischen Länder zu ermutigen, sich durch eigene Anstrengungen vom Block zu lösen, wollten jedoch eine militärische Konfrontation zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion vermeiden, da eine Eskalation zu einem Atomkrieg führen könnte. Aus diesen Gründen mussten die politischen Entscheidungsträger der USA andere Mittel zur Verminderung des sowjetischen Einflusses in Osteuropa in Betracht ziehen, abgesehen von einer Rollback-Politik. Dies führte zur Entwicklung von Eindämmungsmaßnahmen wie wirtschaftlicher und psychologischer Krieg, verdeckten Operationen und später Verhandlungen mit der Sowjetunion über den Status der östlichen Staaten. [37] Vizepräsident Richard Nixon hatte sich ebenfalls vor dem Nationalen Sicherheitsrat gestritten dass es den Interessen der USA dienen würde, wenn die Sowjetunion einen weiteren Aufstand wie in Polen unternehmen würde, um eine Quelle antikommunistischer Propaganda zu sein. [38] Der Direktor der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles, hatte jedoch behauptet, dass er die Gründung der Sowjetunion anstrebte Ein umfangreiches Netzwerk in Ungarn, zu der Zeit hatte die Agentur keinen ungarischen Sender, fast keine Agenten, die die Sprache sprachen, und unzuverlässige, korrupte lokale Vermögenswerte. Die eigene Geheimgeschichte der Agentur gab zu: "Zu keiner Zeit hatten wir irgendetwas, was man für eine Geheimdienstoperation halten konnte oder hätte halten können." [39]

Im Sommer 1956 wurden die Beziehungen zwischen Ungarn und der Ukraine Die USA begannen sich zu verbessern. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt reagierten die USA sehr positiv auf Ungarns Offerten bezüglich eines möglichen Ausbaus der bilateralen Handelsbeziehungen. Der Wunsch Ungarns nach besseren Beziehungen war zum Teil auf die katastrophale wirtschaftliche Lage des Landes zurückzuführen. Bevor jedoch Ergebnisse erzielt werden konnten, wurde das Verhandlungstempo durch das ungarische Innenministerium verlangsamt, das befürchtete, dass bessere Beziehungen zum Westen die kommunistische Herrschaft in Ungarn schwächen könnten. [37]


Soziale Unruhen bauen ] edit ]


Rákosis Rücktritt im Juli 1956 ermutigte Studenten, Schriftsteller und Journalisten, aktiver und kritischer in der Politik zu sein. Studenten und Journalisten gründeten eine Reihe intellektueller Foren, in denen die Probleme Ungarns untersucht wurden. Diese Foren, die Petőfi-Kreise genannt wurden, wurden sehr populär und zogen Tausende von Teilnehmern an. [40] Am 6. Oktober 1956 wurde László Rajk, der von der Regierung von Rákosi hingerichtet worden war, in einer Umzugszeremonie neu bestattet, die die Parteiopposition stärkte. [41]

Am 16. Oktober 1956 unterdrückten Universitätsstudenten in Szeged die offizielle kommunistische Studentenvereinigung DISZ, indem sie die MEFESZ (Vereinigung ungarischer Universitäts- und Akademiestudenten), eine demokratische Studentenorganisation, gründeten. zuvor unter der Rákosi-Diktatur verboten. [11] Innerhalb weniger Tage folgten die Studentengremien von Pécs, Miskolc und Sopron. Am 22. Oktober stellten die Studenten der Technischen Universität eine Liste von sechzehn Punkten zusammen, die verschiedene nationale politische Forderungen enthielten. [42] Nachdem die Studenten gehört hatten, dass der Ungarische Schriftstellerverband am folgenden Tag die Solidarität mit den Reformbewegungen in Polen zum Ausdruck bringen wollte An der Statue des in Polen geborenen Helden General Józef Zachariasz Bem, der auch ein Held der ungarischen Revolution von 1848 (1848–49) war, entschlossen sich die Studenten, eine parallele Demonstration von Sympathie und Einheit zu organisieren. [36][43]


Revolution [ edit ]


Erste Schüsse [ edit ]


Am Nachmittag des 23. Oktober 1956 kamen ungefähr 20.400 Demonstranten neben der Statue von József zusammen Bem - ein Nationalheld von Polen und Ungarn. [44] Péter Veres, Präsident des Schriftstellerverbandes, las der Menge ein Manifest vor, darunter: Der Wunsch, dass Ungarn von allen ausländischen Mächten unabhängig ist; ein auf demokratischem Sozialismus basierendes politisches System (Landreform und öffentliches Eigentum von Unternehmen); Ungarn tritt den Vereinten Nationen bei; und die Bürger Ungarns sollten alle Rechte an freien Männern haben. [45] Nachdem die Studenten ihre Proklamation gelesen hatten, sang die Menge ein zensiertes patriotisches Gedicht "National Song" mit dem Refrain: "Dies schwören wir, das schwören wir Wir werden keine Sklaven mehr sein. " Jemand in der Menge schnitt das kommunistische Wappen von der ungarischen Flagge ab und hinterließ ein markantes Loch, und andere folgten ihm schnell. [46]
Danach überquerte der größte Teil der Menschen die Donau, um sich den Demonstranten vor dem Parlamentsgebäude anzuschließen. Um 18:00 Uhr war die Menge auf über 200.000 Menschen angewachsen; die Demonstration war [47] lebhaft, aber friedlich. [48]


Einbringen der ungarischen Flagge in Überreste einer demontierten Stalin-Statue

Um 20:00 Uhr, Erster Sekretär Ernő Gerő strahlte eine Rede aus, in der er die Forderungen der Schriftsteller und Studenten verurteilte. [48] Verärgert über Gerős strikte Ablehnung entschlossen sich einige Demonstranten, eine ihrer Forderungen, die Entfernung von Stalins 9,1 m hoher Bronzestatue, auszuführen Diese wurde 1951 an der Stelle einer Kirche errichtet, die abgerissen wurde, um Platz für das Denkmal zu schaffen. [49] Um 21:30 Uhr wurde die Statue gestürzt und die Menschenmenge durch das Einfügen von ungarischen Flaggen in Stalins Stiefel gefeiert, was alles war Links von der Statue. [48]

Ungefähr zur gleichen Zeit versammelte sich eine große Menschenmenge im Radio Budapest-Gebäude, das von der ÁVH schwer bewacht wurde. Der Flammpunkt war erreicht, als eine Delegation, die versuchte, ihre Forderungen zu verbreiten, festgenommen wurde und die Menge immer unruhiger wurde, als sich Gerüchte verbreiteten, dass die Demonstranten erschossen worden seien. Tränengas wurde aus den oberen Fenstern geworfen, und die ÁVH eröffnete das Feuer auf die Menge und tötete viele. [50] Die ÁVH versuchte sich wieder zu versorgen, indem sie die Arme in einem Krankenwagen versteckte, aber die Menge entdeckte die List und stoppte sie ab. Ungarische Soldaten, die geschickt wurden, um die ÁVH zu entlasten, zögerten und zogen dann die roten Sterne aus den Kappen, um sich neben die Menge zu stellen. [46][50] Durch den Angriff der ÁVH provoziert, reagierten die Demonstranten heftig. Polizeiautos wurden in Brand gesetzt, Waffen aus militärischen Depots beschlagnahmt und an die Massen verteilt, und Symbole des kommunistischen Regimes wurden vandalisiert. [51]


Ausbreitung von Kämpfen, Regierung stürzt ab [


In der Nacht zum 23. Oktober forderte der ungarische Vertreter der Arbeiterpartei Ernő Gerő die sowjetische Militärintervention auf, "um eine Demonstration zu unterdrücken, die einen nie dagewesenen Umfang erreichte". [35] Die sowjetische Führung hatte bereits einige Monate zuvor Notfallpläne für die Intervention in Ungarn formuliert [52] Am 24. Oktober um 02:00 Uhr gelangten die sowjetischen Panzer nach den Anweisungen des sowjetischen Verteidigungsministers Georgy Zhukov nach Budapest. [53]

Bis zum 24. Oktober, 24. Oktober Sowjetische Panzer waren vor dem Parlament stationiert, und sowjetische Soldaten bewachten Schlüsselbrücken und Kreuzungen. Bewaffnete Revolutionäre errichteten rasch Barrikaden, um Budapest zu verteidigen, und hatten angeblich bereits am Vormittag einige sowjetische Panzer erobert. [46] An diesem Tag ersetzte Imre Nagy András Hegedüs als Premierminister. [54] Im Radio rief Nagy ein Ende der Gewalt und versprach, politische Reformen einzuleiten, die drei Jahre zuvor eingestellt worden waren. Die Bevölkerung bewaffnete sich weiterhin, als sporadische Gewalt ausbrach. [55]


März der Demonstranten am 25. Oktober

Bewaffnete Demonstranten beschlagnahmten das Rundfunkgebäude. In den Büros der kommunistischen Zeitung Szabad Nép wurden unbewaffnete Demonstranten von den Wachen der ÁVH beschossen, die dann vertrieben wurden, als bewaffnete Demonstranten ankamen. [55] An diesem Punkt konzentrierte sich der Zorn der Revolutionäre auf die ÁVH; 19659118] Die sowjetischen Truppen waren noch nicht vollständig im Einsatz, und es gab Berichte, dass einige sowjetische Truppen offenes Mitgefühl für die Demonstranten zeigten. 19459143 [57]

Am 25. Oktober versammelten sich Demonstranten vor Demonstranten das Parlamentsgebäude. ÁVH-Einheiten begannen, von den Dächern benachbarter Gebäude in die Menge zu schießen. [58][59] Einige der sowjetischen Soldaten brannten das Feuer auf die ÁVH zurück und glaubten fälschlicherweise, sie seien die Ziele der Schießerei Ungarische Soldaten, die sich dem Aufstand angeschlossen hatten, fingen an, in der Menge zurückzuschießen. [46] [58]

In dieser Zeit wurde die ungarische Armee als zentrale Befehlsstruktur geteilt zerbrach mit dem steigenden Druck der Proteste gegen die Regierung. Die Mehrheit der ungarischen Militäreinheiten in Budapest und auf dem Land blieb unbeteiligt, da die örtlichen Kommandanten generell Gewalt gegen die Demonstranten und Revolutionäre vermieden hatten. [61] Vom 24. bis 29. Oktober kam es jedoch zu 71 bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der Armee und der Armee Die Bevölkerung in fünfzig Gemeinden reicht von der Verteidigung von Angriffen auf zivile und militärische Ziele bis hin zum Kampf mit Aufständischen in Abhängigkeit vom Kommandanten. [19459151[61]

Ein Beispiel ist am 26. Oktober in der Stadt Kecskemét Dort, wo Demonstrationen vor dem Amt für Staatssicherheit und das örtliche Gefängnis zu einer militärischen Aktion des Dritten Korps auf Anordnung von Generalmajor Lajos Gyurkó führten, bei der sieben Demonstranten erschossen und mehrere der Organisatoren festgenommen wurden. In einem anderen Fall verprügelte ein Kampfflugzeug in der Stadt Tiszakécske einen Protest. Dabei wurden 17 Menschen getötet und 117 verletzt. [61]

Die Angriffe auf das Parlament erzwangen den Zusammenbruch der Regierung. [62] Der erste kommunistische Minister Ernő Gerő und der frühere Premierminister András Hegedüs flohen in die Sowjetunion. Imre Nagy wurde Premierminister und János Kádár Erster Sekretär der Kommunistischen Partei. Revolutionäre begannen eine aggressive Offensive gegen sowjetische Truppen und die Überreste der ÁVH.


Gremium eines hingerichteten Parteimitglieds im Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei

Nach Angriffen auf das Gebäude des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei wurden von Béla Király angeführten Einheiten Dutzende mutmaßlicher Kommunisten, Mitglieder der Staatssicherheit und militärisches Personal hingerichtet . Fotos zeigten Opfer mit Anzeichen von Folter. Am 30. Oktober griffen die Streitkräfte von Király das Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei an. [64] Der ungarische kommunistische Politiker János Berecz behauptete in seinem von der Regierung gesponserten "Weißbuch" über die Revolution, dass die Rebellen Tausende von Menschen inhaftierten mehr hatten ihre Namen auf Todeslisten. Laut seinem Buch wurden am 31. Oktober in der Stadt Kaposvár 64 Personen, darunter 13 Offiziere, inhaftiert. [65]

In Budapest und anderen Gebieten - nach Angaben von Berecz und anderen Quellen der Kádár-Ära - Die ungarischen kommunistischen Komitees organisierten die Verteidigung. Im Stadtteil Csepel von Budapest verteidigten rund 250 Kommunisten die Csepel-Eisen- und Stahlfabrik. Am 27. Oktober wurden Truppen der Armee eingesetzt, um Csepel zu sichern und die Ordnung wiederherzustellen. Später zogen sie sich am 29. Oktober zurück, und die Rebellen übernahmen die Kontrolle über das Gebiet. Die Kommunisten des Budapester Stadtteils Angyalföld führten über 350 bewaffnete Arbeiter und 380 Soldaten aus der Láng-Fabrik. Antifaschistische Widerstandsveteranen aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg nahmen an der Offensive teil, durch die das Gebäude der Zeitung Szabad Nép zurückerobert wurde. Auf dem Land wurden Verteidigungsmaßnahmen von pro-kommunistischen Kräften ergriffen. Im Bezirk Békés, in und um die Stadt Szarvas, hatten die bewaffneten Wächter der Kommunistischen Partei die Kontrolle [66]

. Als der ungarische Widerstand sowjetische Panzer mit Molotow-Cocktails in den engen Straßen bekämpfte In Budapest traten revolutionäre Räte bundesweit auf, übernahmen lokale Regierungsbehörden und forderten Generalstreiks. Öffentliche kommunistische Symbole wie rote Sterne und sowjetische Kriegerdenkmäler wurden entfernt und kommunistische Bücher verbrannt. Es entstanden spontane revolutionäre Milizen, wie etwa die 400-Mann-Gruppe, die lose von József Dudás angeführt wurde, der sowjetische Sympathisanten und Mitglieder der ÁVH angegriffen oder ermordet hatte. [67] Sowjetische Einheiten kämpften hauptsächlich in Budapest; anderswo war die Landschaft weitgehend ruhig. Eine in Budapest stationierte Panzerdivision, die von Pál Maléter befehligt wurde, entschied sich stattdessen dafür, den Aufständischen beizutreten. Die sowjetischen Kommandeure verhandelten häufig mit den Revolutionären über örtliche Waffenstillstände. [68]

In einigen Regionen gelang es den sowjetischen Streitkräften, revolutionäre Aktivitäten zu unterdrücken. In Budapest gerieten die Sowjets schließlich zum Stillstand und die Feindseligkeiten ließen nach. Der ungarische General Béla Király, der wegen politischer Straftaten von der lebenslangen Haft befreit wurde und mit Unterstützung der Regierung Nagy agierte, versuchte die Ordnung wiederherzustellen, indem er Teile der Polizei, der Armee und der Aufständischen zu einer Nationalgarde vereinigte. [69] Ein Waffenstillstand wurde arrangiert am 28. Oktober und am 30. Oktober hatten sich die meisten sowjetischen Truppen aus Budapest in Garnisonen auf dem ungarischen Land zurückgezogen. [70]


Zwischenspiel [ edit


Der Kampf wurde zwischen dem 28. Oktober und dem 4. November eingestellt. Viele Ungarn glaubten an einen Rückzug der sowjetischen Militäreinheiten aus Ungarn. [71] Nach Angaben der nachrevolutionären kommunistischen Quellen wurden ungefähr 213 ungarische ArbeiterInnenpartei während dieser Zeit gelyncht oder hingerichtet. [72]


Neue Regierung edit ]


Flyer. Imre Nagy, Regierungschef - 1956.10.27

Die rasche Ausbreitung des Aufstands in den Straßen von Budapest und der abrupte Sturz der Regierung Gerő-Hegedüs ließen die neue nationale Führung überrascht und zunächst unstrukturiert erscheinen. Nagy, ein loyaler Parteireformer, der als "nur bescheidene politische Fähigkeiten" bezeichnet wurde, [73] appellierte an die Öffentlichkeit, um Ruhe und eine Rückkehr zur alten Ordnung zu fordern. Doch Nagy, der einzige verbliebene ungarische Führer, der sowohl in der Öffentlichkeit als auch bei den Sowjets glaubwürdig ist, "schlussfolgerte schließlich", dass ein Volksaufstand statt einer Konterrevolution stattfand. "[74] Um 13:20 Uhr am 28 Im Oktober kündigte Nagy einen sofortigen und generellen Waffenstillstand über Funk an und erklärte im Namen der neuen nationalen Regierung Folgendes:


  • dass die Regierung den Aufstand nicht als konterrevolutionär, sondern als "großes, nationales und demokratisches Ereignis" einschätzen würde

  • ein bedingungsloser allgemeiner Waffenstillstand und Amnestie für diejenigen, die an dem Aufstand teilgenommen haben; Verhandlungen mit den Aufständischen

  • über die Auflösung der ÁVH

  • über die Errichtung einer Nationalgarde

  • den sofortigen Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen aus Budapest und Verhandlungen über den Abzug aller sowjetischen Truppen aus Ungarn

Am 1. November In einer Radioansprache an das ungarische Volk erklärte Nagy formell den Rückzug Ungarns aus dem Warschauer Pakt sowie die Neutralitätshaltung Ungarns. [61][75][76] Da die nationale Regierung nur zehn Tage im Amt war, hatte die nationale Regierung wenig Gelegenheit, ihre Politik detailliert zu erklären. Die damaligen Zeitungsredaktionen betonten jedoch, dass Ungarn eine neutrale Mehrparteien-Sozialdemokratie sein sollte. [77] Viele politische Gefangene wurden freigelassen, vor allem Kardinal József Mindszenty. [78] Bisher verbotene politische Parteien wie der Unabhängige Kleinbauern und die nationale Bauernpartei (unter dem Namen "Petőfi-Partei"), [79] tauchten wieder auf, um sich der Koalition anzuschließen. [80]


Menschenmenge bejubelt ungarische Truppen in Budapest

In dieser Zeit gab es in 1170 Gemeinden in ganz Ungarn 348 Fälle in denen revolutionäre Räte und Demonstranten Angestellte der örtlichen Verwaltungsräte entließen, 312 Fälle, in denen sie die Verantwortlichen entlassen hatten, und 215 Fälle, in denen sie die lokalen Verwaltungsakten und Aufzeichnungen verbrannten. Darüber hinaus beschädigten Demonstranten in 681 Gemeinden Symbole sowjetischer Autorität wie rote Sterne, Stalin- oder Lenin-Statuen; 393, in denen sie sowjetische Kriegerdenkmäler beschädigten, und 122 Gemeinden, in denen Buchverbrennungen stattfanden. [13] [61]

In ganz Ungarn bildeten sich Revolutionäre Räte, [81][82][83][84] . im Allgemeinen ohne Beteiligung der besetzten Nationalregierung in Budapest und übernahm verschiedene Verantwortlichkeiten der Kommunalverwaltung von der aufgelösten kommunistischen Partei. [85] Bis zum 30. Oktober waren diese Räte von der ungarischen Arbeiterpartei offiziell gebilligt worden, und die Regierung von Nagy forderte ihre Unterstützung als "autonome, demokratische lokale Organe, die während der Revolution gebildet wurden". [85] Ebenso wurden Arbeiterräte in Industriebetrieben und Minen eingerichtet, und viele unpopuläre Regelungen wie Produktionsnormen wurden aufgehoben. Die Betriebsräte bemühten sich, das Unternehmen zu führen und gleichzeitig die Interessen der Arbeitnehmer zu schützen, wodurch eine sozialistische Wirtschaft frei von strengen Parteikontrollen geschaffen wurde. [86] Die lokale Kontrolle durch die Räte war nicht immer unblutig; in Debrecen, Győr, Sopron, Mosonmagyaróvár and other cities, crowds of demonstrators were fired upon by the ÁVH, with many lives lost. The ÁVH were disarmed, often by force, in many cases assisted by the local police.[85]

In total there were approximately 2,100 local revolutionary and workers councils with over 28,000 members. These councils held a combined conference in Budapest, deciding to end the nationwide labour strikes and resume work on 5 November, with the more important councils sending delegates to the Parliament to assure the Nagy government of their support.[61]


Soviet perspective[edit]


On 24 October, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the Politburo) discussed the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary. A hard-line faction led by Molotov was pushing for intervention, but Khrushchev and Marshal Zhukov were initially opposed. A delegation in Budapest reported that the situation was not as dire as had been portrayed. Khrushchev stated that he believed that Party Secretary Ernő Gerő's request for intervention on 23 October indicated that the Hungarian Party still held the confidence of the Hungarian public. In addition, he saw the protests not as an ideological struggle, but as popular discontent over unresolved basic economic and social issues.[35] The concurrent Suez Crisis was another reason to not intervene; as Khrushchev said on 28 October, it would be a mistake to imitate the "real mess" of the French and British.[87]

After some debate,[88][89] the Presidium on 30 October decided not to remove the new Hungarian government. Even Marshal Georgy Zhukov said: "We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole. This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere." They adopted a Declaration of the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Stateswhich was issued the next day. This document proclaimed: "The Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary."[90] Thus for a brief moment it looked like there could be a peaceful solution.


Damaged Party headquarters on Köztársaság tér

On 30 October, armed protesters attacked the ÁVH detachment guarding the Budapest Hungarian Working People's Party headquarters on Köztársaság tér (Republic Square), incited by rumours of prisoners held there and the earlier shootings of demonstrators by the ÁVH in the city of Mosonmagyaróvár.[85][91][92] Over 20 ÁVH officers were killed, some of them lynched by the mob. Hungarian army tanks sent to rescue the party headquarters mistakenly bombarded the building.[92] The head of the Budapest party committee, Imre Mező, was wounded and later died.[93][94] Scenes from Republic Square were shown on Soviet newsreels a few hours later.[95] Revolutionary leaders in Hungary condemned the incident and appealed for calm, and the mob violence soon died down,[96] but images of the victims were nevertheless used as propaganda by various Communist organs.[94]

On 31 October the Soviet leaders decided to reverse their decision from the previous day. There is disagreement among historians whether Hungary's declaration to exit the Warsaw Pact caused the second Soviet intervention. Minutes of 31 October meeting of the Presidium record that the decision to intervene militarily was taken one day before Hungary declared its neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.[97] Historians who deny that Hungarian neutrality—or other factors such as Western inaction in Hungary or perceived Western weakness due to the Suez crisis—caused the intervention state that the Soviet decision was based solely on the rapid loss of Communist control in Hungary.[87] However, some Russian historians who are not advocates of the Communist era maintain that the Hungarian declaration of neutrality caused the Kremlin to intervene a second time.[98]

Two days earlier, on 30 October, when Soviet Politburo representatives Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov were in Budapest, Nagy had hinted that neutrality was a long-term objective for Hungary, and that he was hoping to discuss this matter with the leaders in the Kremlin. This information was passed on to Moscow by Mikoyan and Suslov.[99][100] At that time, Khrushchev was in Stalin's dacha, considering his options regarding Hungary. One of his speech writers later said that the declaration of neutrality was an important factor in his subsequent decision to support intervention.[101] In addition, some Hungarian leaders of the revolution as well as students had called for their country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact much earlier, and this may have influenced Soviet decision making.[102]

Several other key events alarmed the Presidium and cemented the interventionists' position:[103][104]


  • Simultaneous movements towards multi-party parliamentary democracy, and a democratic national council of workers, which could "lead towards a capitalist state". Both movements challenged the pre-eminence of the Soviet Communist Party in Eastern Europe and perhaps Soviet hegemony itself. Hannah Arendt considered the councils "the only free and acting soviets (councils) in existence anywhere in the world".[105][106]

  • Khrushchev stated that many in the Communist Party would not understand a failure to respond with force in Hungary. Destalinisation had alienated the more conservative elements of the Party, who were alarmed at threats to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. On 17 June 1953, workers in East Berlin had staged an uprising, demanding the resignation of the government of the German Democratic Republic. This was quickly and violently put down with the help of the Soviet military, with 84 killed and wounded and 700 arrested.[107] In June 1956, in Poznań, Poland, an anti-government workers' revolt had been suppressed by the Polish security forces with between 57[108] and 78[109][110] deaths and led to the installation of a less Soviet-controlled government. Additionally, by late October, unrest was noticed in some regional areas of the Soviet Union: while this unrest was minor, it was intolerable.

  • Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact represented a breach in the Soviet defensive buffer zone of satellite nations.[111] Soviet fear of invasion from the West made a defensive buffer of allied states in Eastern Europe an essential security objective.
Soviet T-54 tanks in Budapest on 31 October

The militants arrived at the conclusion that "the Party is the incarnation of bureaucratic despotism" and that "socialism can develop only on the foundations of direct democracy". For them the struggle of the Hungarian workers was a struggle "for the principle of direct democracy" and "all power should be transferred to the Workers Committees of Hungary".[112] The Presidium decided to break the de facto ceasefire and crush the Hungarian revolution.[113] The plan was to declare a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" under János Kádár, who would appeal for Soviet assistance to restore order. According to witnesses, Kádár was in Moscow in early November,[114] and he was in contact with the Soviet embassy while still a member of the Nagy government.[115] Delegations were sent to other Communist governments in Eastern Europe and China, seeking to avoid a regional conflict, and propaganda messages prepared for broadcast when the second Soviet intervention had begun. To disguise these intentions, Soviet diplomats were to engage the Nagy government in talks discussing the withdrawal of Soviet forces.[97]

According to some sources, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong played an important role in Khrushchev's decision to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Chinese Communist Party Deputy Chairman Liu Shaoqi pressured Khrushchev to send in troops to put down the revolt by force.[116][117] Although the relations between China and the Soviet Union had deteriorated during the recent years, Mao's words still carried great weight in the Kremlin, and they were frequently in contact during the crisis. Initially, Mao opposed a second intervention, and this information was passed on to Khrushchev on 30 October, before the Presidium met and decided against intervention.[118] Mao then changed his mind in favour of intervention but, according to William Taubman, it remains unclear when and how Khrushchev learned of this and thus if it influenced his decision on 31 October.[119]

From 1 to 3 November, Khrushchev left Moscow to meet with his European allies and inform them of the decision to intervene. At the first such meeting, he met with Władysław Gomułka in Brest. Then, he had talks with the Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders in Bucharest. Finally Khrushchev flew with Malenkov to Yugoslavia, where they met with Josip Broz Tito, who was on holiday on his island Brioni in the Adriatic Sea. The Yugoslavs also persuaded Khrushchev to choose János Kádár instead of Ferenc Münnich as the new leader of Hungary.[120][121] Two months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in Nikolai Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head, especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited the employees of the Yugoslav security organs to violence".[122]


International reaction[edit]


Although John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary of State recommended on 24 October for the United Nations Security Council to convene to discuss the situation in Hungary, little immediate action was taken to introduce a resolution,[123] in part because other world events unfolded the day after the peaceful interlude started, when allied collusion started the Suez Crisis. The problem was not that Suez distracted US attention from Hungary but that it made the condemnation of Soviet actions very difficult. As Vice President Richard Nixon later explained, "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against [Gamel Abdel] Nasser".[37]

The US response was reliant on the CIA to covertly effect change, with both covert agents and Radio Free Europe. However, their Hungarian operations collapsed rapidly and they could not locate any of the weapon caches hidden across Europe, nor be sure to whom they'd send arms. The agency's main source of information were the newspapers and a State Department employee in Budapest called Geza Katona.[39] By 28 October, on the same night that the new Nagy government came to power, RFE was ramping up its broadcasts—encouraging armed struggle, advising on how to combat tanks and signing off with "Freedom or Death!"—on the orders of Frank Wisner. When Nagy did come to power, CIA director Allen Dulles advised the White House that Cardinal Mindszenty would be a better leader (due to Nagy's communist past); he had CIA radio broadcasts run propaganda against Nagy, calling him a traitor who'd invited Soviet troops in. Transmissions continued to broadcast armed response while the CIA mistakenly believed that the Hungarian army was switching sides and the rebels were gaining arms.[124] (Wisner was recorded as having a "nervous breakdown" by William Colby as the uprising was crushed.[125])



Responding to the plea by Nagy at the time of the second massive Soviet intervention on 4 November, the Security Council resolution critical of Soviet actions was vetoed by the Soviet Union; instead resolution 120 was adopted to pass the matter onto the General Assembly. The General Assembly, by a vote of 50 in favour, 8 against and 15 abstentions, called on the Soviet Union to end its Hungarian intervention, but the newly constituted Kádár government rejected UN observers.[126]

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was aware of a detailed study of Hungarian resistance that recommended against US military intervention,[127] and of earlier policy discussions within the National Security Council that focused upon encouraging discontent in Soviet satellite nations only by economic policies and political rhetoric.[37][128] In a 1998 interview, Hungarian Ambassador Géza Jeszenszky was critical of Western inaction in 1956, citing the influence of the United Nations at that time and giving the example of UN intervention in Korea from 1950 to 1953.[129]

However, a Department of Defense study recently declassified by the National Security Archive suggests that one of the main reasons the United States did not intervene was the risk of inadvertently starting a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. These concerns made the Eisenhower Administration take a more cautious approach to the situation.[130]

During the uprising, the Radio Free Europe (RFE) Hungarian-language programs broadcast news of the political and military situation, as well as appealing to Hungarians to fight the Soviet forces, including tactical advice on resistance methods. After the Soviet suppression of the revolution, RFE was criticised for having misled the Hungarian people that NATO or United Nations would intervene if citizens continued to resist.[131] Allen Dulles lied to Eisenhower that RFE had not promised US aid; Eisenhower believed him, as the transcripts of the broadcasts were kept secret.[124]


Soviet intervention of 4 November[edit]


1 November newsreel about the situation in Hungary

On 1 November, Imre Nagy received reports that Soviet forces had entered Hungary from the east and were moving towards Budapest.[132] Nagy sought and received assurances (which proved false) from Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov that the Soviet Union would not invade. The Cabinet, with János Kádár in agreement, declared Hungary's neutrality, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, and requested assistance from the diplomatic corps in Budapest and the UN Secretary-General to defend Hungary's neutrality.[133] Ambassador Andropov was asked to inform his government that Hungary would begin negotiations on the removal of Soviet forces immediately.[134][135]

On 3 November, a Hungarian delegation led by the Minister of Defense Pál Maléter was invited to attend negotiations on Soviet withdrawal at the Soviet Military Command at Tököl, near Budapest. At around midnight that evening, General Ivan Serov, Chief of the Soviet Security Police (KGB) ordered the arrest of the Hungarian delegation,[136] and the next day, the Soviet army again attacked Budapest.[137] During the early hours of 4 November, Ferenc Münnich announced on Radio Szolnok the establishment of the "Revolutionary Workers'-Peasants' Government of Hungary".


A Soviet built armored car burns on a street in Budapest in November

The second Soviet intervention, codenamed "Operation Whirlwind", was launched by Marshal Ivan Konev.[104][138] The five Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary before 23 October were augmented to a total strength of 17 divisions.[139] The 8th Mechanized Army under command of Lieutenant General Hamazasp Babadzhanian and the 38th Army under Lieutenant General Hadzhi-Umar Mamsurovs from the nearby Carpathian Military District were deployed to Hungary for the operation.[140] Some rank-and-file Soviet soldiers reportedly believed they were being sent to Berlin to fight German fascists.[141] By 21:30 on 3 November, the Soviet Army had completely encircled Budapest.[142]

At 03:00 on 4 November, Soviet tanks penetrated Budapest along the Pest side of the Danube in two thrusts: one up the Soroksári road from the south and the other down the Váci road from the north. Thus before a single shot was fired, the Soviets had effectively split the city in half, controlled all bridgeheads, and were shielded to the rear by the wide Danube river. Armoured units crossed into Buda and at 04:25 fired the first shots at the army barracks on Budaörsi Road. Soon after, Soviet artillery and tank fire was heard in all districts of Budapest.[142] Operation Whirlwind combined air strikes, artillery, and the co-ordinated tank-infantry action of 17 divisions.[143]


Two Soviet ISU-152 assault guns positioned in a street in Budapest 8th District. An abandoned T-34/85 stands behind them

Between 4 and 9 November, the Hungarian Army put up sporadic and disorganised resistance, with Marshal Zhukov reporting the disarming of twelve divisions, two armoured regiments, and the entire Hungarian Air Force. The Hungarian Army continued its most formidable resistance in various districts of Budapest and in and around the city of Pécs in the Mecsek Mountains, and in the industrial centre of Dunaújváros (then called Stalintown). Fighting in Budapest consisted of between ten and fifteen thousand resistance fighters, with the heaviest fighting occurring in the working-class stronghold of Csepel on the Danube River.[144] Although some very senior officers were openly pro-Soviet, the rank and file soldiers were overwhelmingly loyal to the revolution and either fought against the invasion or deserted. The United Nations reported that there were no recorded incidents of Hungarian Army units fighting on the side of the Soviets.[145]

At 05:20 on 4 November, Imre Nagy broadcast his final plea to the nation and the world, announcing that Soviet Forces were attacking Budapest and that the Government remained at its post.[146] The radio station, Free Kossuth Rádió, stopped broadcasting at 08:07.[147] An emergency Cabinet meeting was held in the Parliament but was attended by only three ministers. As Soviet troops arrived to occupy the building, a negotiated evacuation ensued, leaving Minister of State István Bibó as the last representative of the National Government remaining at his post.[148] He wrote For Freedom and Truth, a stirring proclamation to the nation and the world.[149]


Ruszkik haza! (Russians go home!) slogan in Budapest

At 06:00, on 4 November,[150] in the town of Szolnok, János Kádár proclaimed the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government". His statement declared "We must put an end to the excesses of the counter-revolutionary elements. The hour for action has sounded. We are going to defend the interest of the workers and peasants and the achievements of the people's democracy."[151] Later that evening, Kádár called upon "the faithful fighters of the true cause of socialism" to come out of hiding and take up arms. However, Hungarian support did not materialise; the fighting did not take on the character of an internally divisive civil war, but rather, in the words of a United Nations report, that of "a well-equipped foreign army crushing by overwhelming force a national movement and eliminating the Government."[152]


Rubble after end of fighting in Budapest 8th District

By 08:00 organised defence of the city evaporated after the radio station was seized, and many defenders fell back to fortified positions.[153] During the same hour, the parliamentary guard laid down their arms, and forces under Major General K. Grebennik captured Parliament and liberated captured ministers of the Rákosi-Hegedüs government. Among the liberated were István Dobi and Sándor Rónai, both of whom became members of the re-established socialist Hungarian government.[144] As they came under attack even in civilian quarters, Soviet troops were unable to differentiate military from civilian targets.[154] For this reason, Soviet tanks often crept along main roads firing indiscriminately into buildings.[153] Hungarian resistance was strongest in the industrial areas of Budapest, with Csepel heavily targeted by Soviet artillery and air strikes.[155]

The longest holdouts against the Soviet assault occurred in Csepel and in Dunaújváros, where fighting lasted until 11 November before the insurgents finally succumbed to the Soviets.[61] At the end of the fighting, Hungarian casualties totalled around 2,500 dead with an additional 20,000 wounded. Budapest bore the brunt of the bloodshed, with 1,569 civilians killed.[61] Approximately 53 percent of the dead were workers, and about half of all the casualties were people younger than thirty. On the Soviet side, 699 men were killed, 1,450 men were wounded, and 51 men were missing in action. Estimates place around 80 percent of all casualties occurring in fighting with the insurgents in the eighth and ninth districts of Budapest.[61][156][157]


Soviet version of the events[edit]


Soviet reports of the events surrounding, during, and after the disturbance were remarkably consistent in their accounts, more so after the Second Soviet intervention cemented support for the Soviet position among international Communist Parties. Pravda published an account 36 hours after the outbreak of violence, which set the tone for all further reports and subsequent Soviet historiography:[158]


  1. On 23 October, the honest socialist Hungarians demonstrated against mistakes made by the Rákosi and Gerő governments.

  2. Fascist, Hitlerite, reactionary, counter-revolutionary hooligans financed by the imperialist West took advantage of the unrest to stage a counter-revolution.

  3. The honest Hungarian people under Nagy appealed to Soviet (Warsaw Pact) forces stationed in Hungary to assist in restoring order.

  4. The Nagy government was ineffective, allowing itself to be penetrated by counter-revolutionary influences, weakening then disintegrating, as proven by Nagy's culminating denouncement of the Warsaw Pact.

  5. Hungarian patriots under Kádár broke with the Nagy government and formed a government of honest Hungarian revolutionary workers and peasants; this genuinely popular government petitioned the Soviet command to help put down the counter-revolution.

  6. Hungarian patriots, with Soviet assistance, smashed the counter-revolution.

The first Soviet report came out 24 hours after the first Western report. Nagy's appeal to the United Nations was not reported. After Nagy was arrested outside the Yugoslav embassy, his arrest was not reported. Nor did accounts explain how Nagy went from patriot to traitor.[159] The Soviet press reported calm in Budapest while the Western press reported a revolutionary crisis was breaking out. According to the Soviet account, Hungarians never wanted a revolution at all.[158]

In January 1957, representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania met in Budapest to review internal developments in Hungary since the establishment of the Soviet-imposed government. A communiqué on the meeting "unanimously concluded" that Hungarian workers, with the leadership of the Kádár government and support of the Soviet army, defeated attempts "to eliminate the socialist achievements of the Hungarian people".[160]

Soviet, Chinese, and other Warsaw Pact governments urged Kádár to proceed with interrogation and trial of former Nagy government ministers, and asked for punitive measures against the"counter-revolutionists".[160][161] In addition the Kádár government published an extensive series of "white books" (The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary) documenting real incidents of violence against Communist Party and ÁVH members, and the confessions of Nagy supporters. These white books were widely distributed in several languages in most of the socialist countries and, while based in fact, present factual evidence with a colouring and narrative not generally supported by non-Soviet aligned historians.[162]


Aftermath[edit]


Hungary[edit]


In the immediate aftermath, many thousands of Hungarians were arrested. Eventually, 26,000 of these were brought before the Hungarian courts, 22,000 were sentenced and imprisoned, 13,000 interned, and 229 executed. Approximately 200,000[163] fled Hungary as refugees.[164][165][166] Former Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky estimated 350 were executed.[129] Sporadic resistance and strikes by workers' councils continued until mid-1957, causing economic disruption.[167] By 1963, most political prisoners from the 1956 Hungarian revolution had been released.[168]

With most of Budapest under Soviet control by 8 November, Kádár became Prime Minister of the "Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government" and General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Few Hungarians rejoined the reorganised Party, its leadership having been purged under the supervision of the Soviet Praesidium, led by Georgy Malenkov and Mikhail Suslov.[169] Although Party membership declined from 800,000 before the uprising to 100,000 by December 1956, Kádár steadily increased his control over Hungary and neutralised dissenters. The new government attempted to enlist support by espousing popular principles of Hungarian self-determination voiced during the uprising, but Soviet troops remained.[170] After 1956 the Soviet Union severely purged the Hungarian Army and reinstituted political indoctrination in the units that remained. In May 1957, the Soviet Union increased its troop levels in Hungary and by treaty Hungary accepted the Soviet presence on a permanent basis.[171]

The Red Cross and the Austrian Army established refugee camps in Traiskirchen and Graz.[166][172]Imre Nagy along with Georg Lukács, Géza Losonczy, and László Rajk's widow, Júlia, took refuge in the Embassy of Yugoslavia as Soviet forces overran Budapest. Despite assurances of safe passage out of Hungary by the Soviets and the Kádár government, Nagy and his group were arrested when attempting to leave the embassy on 22 November and taken to Romania. Losonczy died while on a hunger strike in prison awaiting trial when his jailers "carelessly pushed a feeding tube down his windpipe."[173]

The remainder of the group was returned to Budapest in 1958. Nagy was executed, along with Pál Maléter and Miklós Gimes, after secret trials in June 1958. Their bodies were placed in unmarked graves in the Municipal Cemetery outside Budapest.[174]

During the November 1956 Soviet assault on Budapest, Cardinal Mindszenty was granted political asylum at the United States embassy, where he lived for the next 15 years, refusing to leave Hungary unless the government reversed his 1949 conviction for treason. Because of poor health and a request from the Vatican, he finally left the embassy for Austria in September 1971.[175]


International[edit]


Despite Cold War rhetoric by western countries espousing a roll-back of the domination of Europe by the USSR and Soviet promises of the imminent triumph of socialism, national leaders of this period as well as later historians saw the failure of the uprising in Hungary as evidence that the Cold War in Europe had become a stalemate.[176]

The Foreign Minister of West Germany recommended that the people of Eastern Europe be discouraged from "taking dramatic action which might have disastrous consequences for themselves." The Secretary-General of NATO called the Hungarian revolt "the collective suicide of a whole people".[177] In a newspaper interview in 1957, Khrushchev commented "support by United States ... is rather in the nature of the support that the rope gives to a hanged man."[178]


Eleanor Roosevelt meets exiled Hungarian revolutionaries at Camp Roeder in Salzburg, 10 May 1957

In January 1957, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, acting in response to UN General Assembly resolutions requesting investigation and observation of the events in Soviet-occupied Hungary, established the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.[179] The Committee, with representatives from Australia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, conducted hearings in New York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna, and London. Over five months, 111 refugees were interviewed including ministers, military commanders and other officials of the Nagy government, workers, revolutionary council members, factory managers and technicians, Communists and non-Communists, students, writers, teachers, medical personnel, and Hungarian soldiers. Documents, newspapers, radio transcripts, photos, film footage, and other records from Hungary were also reviewed, as well as written testimony of 200 other Hungarians.[180]

The governments of Hungary and Romania refused entry of the UN officials of the Committee, and the government of the Soviet Union did not respond to requests for information.[181] The 268-page Committee Report[182] was presented to the General Assembly in June 1957, documenting the course of the uprising and Soviet intervention and concluding that "the Kádár government and Soviet occupation were in violation of the human rights of the Hungarian people."[183] A General Assembly resolution was approved, deploring "the repression of the Hungarian people and the Soviet occupation", but no other action was taken.[184] The chairman of the Committee was Alsing Andersen, a Danish politician and leading figure of Denmark's Social Democratic Party. He served in the Buhl government in 1942 during the Nazi German occupation of Denmark. He defended collaboration with the occupation forces and denounced the Resistance. He was appointed Interior Minister in 1947, but resigned because of scrutiny of his role in 1940 as Defence Minister. He then entered Denmark's UN delegation in 1948.[185][186]

The Committee Report and the motives of its authors were criticised by the delegations to the United Nations from the Soviet Union and Kádár government. The Hungarian representative disagreed with the report's conclusions, accusing it of falsifying the events, and argued that the establishment of the Committee was illegal. The Committee was accused of being hostile to Hungary and its social system.[187] An article in the Russian journal "International Affairs", published by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, carried an article in 1957 in which it denounced the report as a "collection of falsehoods and distortions".[188]

Time magazine named the Hungarian Freedom Fighter its Man of the Year for 1956. The accompanying Time article comments that this choice could not have been anticipated until the explosive events of the revolution, almost at the end of 1956. The magazine cover and accompanying text displayed an artist's depiction of a Hungarian freedom fighter, and used pseudonyms for the three participants whose stories are the subject of the article.[189] In 2006, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány referred to this famous Time Man of the Year cover as "the faces of free Hungary" in a speech to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1956 uprising.[190] Prime Minister Gyurcsány, in a joint appearance with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, commented specifically on the Time cover itself, that "It is an idealised image but the faces of the figures are really the face of the revolutionaries"[191]

At the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, the Soviet handling of the Hungarian uprising led to a boycott by Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.[192] At the Olympic Village, the Hungarian delegation tore down the Communist Hungarian flag and raised the flag of Free Hungary in its place. A confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian teams occurred in the semi-final match of the water polo tournament on 6 December. The match was extremely violent, and was halted in the final minute to quell fighting among spectators. This match, now known as the "blood in the water match", became the subject of several films.[193][194] The Hungarian team won the game 4–0 and later was awarded the Olympic gold medal. Norway declined an invitation to the inaugural Bandy World Championship in 1957, citing the presence of a team from the Soviet Union as the reason.

On Sunday, 28 October 1956, as some 55 million Americans watched Ed Sullivan's popular television variety show, with the then 21-year-old Elvis Presley headlining for the second time, Sullivan asked viewers to send aid to Hungarian refugees fleeing from the effects of the Soviet invasion. Presley himself made another request for donations during his third and last appearance on Sullivan's show on 6 January 1957. Presley then dedicated a song for the finale, which he thought fitted the mood of the time, namely the gospel song "Peace in the Valley". By the end of 1957, these contributions, distributed by the Geneva-based International Red Cross as food rations, clothing, and other essentials, had amounted to some SFR 26 million (US$6 million in 1957 dollars), the equivalent of $53,500,000 in today's dollars.[195] On 1 March 2011, István Tarlós, the Mayor of Budapest, made Presley an honorary citizen, posthumously, and a plaza located at the intersection of two of the city's most important avenues was named after Presley, as a gesture of gratitude.

Meanwhile, as the 1950s drew to a close the events in Hungary produced fractures within the Communist political parties of Western European countries. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) suffered a split. According to the official newspaper of the PCI, l'Unitàmost ordinary members and the Party leadership, including Palmiro Togliatti and Giorgio Napolitano, supported the actions of the Soviet Union in suppressing the uprising.[196] However, Giuseppe Di Vittorio, chief of the Communist trade union CGIL, spoke out against the leadership's position, as did prominent party members Antonio Giolitti, Loris Fortuna, and many others influential in the Communist party. Pietro Nenni of the Italian Socialist Party, a close ally of the PCI, opposed the Soviet intervention as well. Napolitano, elected in 2006 as President of the Italian Republic, wrote in his 2005 political autobiography that he regretted his justification of Soviet action in Hungary, stating at the time he believed Party unity and the leadership of Soviet communism was more important.[197]

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) suffered the loss of thousands of party members following the events in Hungary. Though Peter Fryer, correspondent for the CPGB newspaper The Daily Workerreported on the violent suppression of the uprising, his dispatches were heavily censored by the party leadership.[141] Upon his return from Hungary Fryer resigned from the paper. He was later expelled by the Communist Party.

In France, moderate Communists, such as historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, resigned, questioning the French Communist Party's policy of supporting Soviet actions. The French philosopher and writer Albert Camus wrote an open letter, The Blood of the Hungarianscriticising the West's lack of action. Even Jean-Paul Sartre, still a determined Communist, criticised the Soviets in his article Le Fantôme de Stalinein Situations VII.[198]Left Communists were particularly supportive of the revolution.


Commemoration[edit]



In December 1991, the preamble of the treaties with the dismembered Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev, and Russia, represented by Boris Yeltsin, apologised officially for the 1956 Soviet actions in Hungary. This apology was repeated by Yeltsin in 1992 during a speech to the Hungarian parliament.[129]

On 13 February 2006, the US State Department commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice commented on the contributions made by 1956 Hungarian refugees to the United States and other host countries, as well as the role of Hungary in providing refuge to East Germans during the 1989 protests against Communist rule.[199]US President George W. Bush also visited Hungary on 22 June 2006, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary.[200]

On 16 June 1989, the 31st anniversary of his execution, Imre Nagy's body was reburied with full honours.[174] The Republic of Hungary was declared in 1989 on the 33rd anniversary of the Revolution, and 23 October is now a Hungarian national holiday.[201]

In the north-west corner of MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, California, the Hungarian-American community built a commemorative statue to honour the Hungarian freedom fighters. Built in the late 1960s, the obelisk statue stands with an American eagle watching over the city of Los Angeles.

There are several monuments dedicated to the Commemoration of the Hungarian Revolution throughout the United States. One such monument may be found here in Cleveland, Ohio at the Cardinal Mindszenty Plaza

There is also a monument of A Boy From Pest in the town of Szczecin, Poland.


See also[edit]




References[edit]



  1. ^ Sources vary widely on numbers of Soviet forces involved in the intervention. The UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) estimated 75,000–200,000 troops and 1,600–4,000 tanks OSZK.hu (p. 56, para. 183), but recently released Soviet archives (available in Lib.ru, Maksim Moshkow's Library) list the troop strength of the Soviet forces as 31,550, with 1,130 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces. Lib.ru Archived 9 February 2010 at the Wayback Machine (in Russian)

  2. ^ Györkei, Jenõ; Kirov, Alexandr; Horvath, Miklos (1999). Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. New York: Central European University Press. p. 370 table 111. ISBN 963-9116-35-1.

  3. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter V footnote 8" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  4. ^ "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict : A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995 (1997)

  5. ^ Alternate references are "Hungarian Revolt" and "Hungarian Uprising". In Hungarian, first the term "felkelés" (uprising) was used, then in the 1957–1988 period the term "ellenforradalom" (counter-revolution) was mandated by the government, while the new official name after 1990 has become "forradalom és szabadságharc" (revolution and freedom fight) to imitate the old expression for the 1848–1849 revolution. Another explanation of the terms is that "Revolution" conforms to both English (see US Department of State background on Hungary) and Hungarian ("forradalom") conventions. There is a distinction between the "complete overthrow" of a revolution and an uprising or revolt that may or may not be successful (Oxford English Dictionary). The 1956 Hungarian event, although short-lived, is a true "revolution" in that the sitting government was deposed. Unlike the terms "coup d'état" and "putsch" that imply action of a few, the 1956 revolution was initiated by the masses.

  6. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). "Chapter VIII (Hungary, a Republic)". Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. pp. 139–52. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. Archived from the original on 3 September 2007. Retrieved 8 October 2006

  7. ^ a b c UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II. A (Developments before 22 October 1956), paragraph 47 (p. 18)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  8. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter IX D, para 426 (p. 133)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  9. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II.N, para 89(xi) (p. 31)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  10. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II. A (Developments before 22 October 1956), paragraphs 49 (p. 18), 379–80 (p. 122) and 382–85 (p. 123)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  11. ^ a b Crampton, R. J. (2003). Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century–and Afterp. 295. Routledge: London. ISBN 0-415-16422-2.

  12. ^ Video: Hungary in Flames CEU.hu Archived 17 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine producer: CBS (1958) – Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306–0–1:40

  13. ^ a b c d Litván, György (1996). The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression. London: Longman.

  14. ^ a b Tőkés, Rudolf L. (1998). Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Successionp. 317. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. ISBN 0-521-57850-7

  15. ^ a b John Lukacs (1994). Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture. Grove Press. p. 222. ISBN 978-0-8021-3250-5.

  16. ^ a b Gati, Charles (September 2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. p. 49. ISBN 0-8047-5606-6. Gati describes "the most gruesome forms of psychological and physical torture ... The reign of terror (by the Rákosi government) turned out to be harsher and more extensive than it was in any of the other Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe." He further references a report prepared after the collapse of communism, the Fact Finding Commission Törvénytelen szocializmus (Lawless Socialism): "Between 1950 and early 1953, the courts dealt with 650,000 cases (of political crimes), of whom 387,000 or 4 percent of the population were found guilty." (Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó/Új Magyarország, 1991, 154).

  17. ^ Kardos, József (2003). "Monograph" (PDF). Iskolakultúra (in Hungarian). University of Pécs. 6–7 (June–July 2003): 73–80. Retrieved 9 October 2006.

  18. ^ Burant, Stephen R., ed. (1990). Hungary: a country study (2nd ed.). Federal Research Division, Kongressbibliothek. p. 320.Chapter 2 (The Society and Its Environment) "Religion and Religious Organizations"

  19. ^ Douglas, J. D. and Philip Comfort (eds.) (1992). Who's Who in Christian Historyp. 478. Tyndale House: Carol Stream, Illinois. ISBN 0-8423-1014-2

  20. ^ The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: Armistice Agreement with Hungary; 20 January 1945 Archived 9 April 2006 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 27 August 2006.

  21. ^ Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). "Memorandum of the Hungarian National Bank on Reparations, Appendix Document 16". Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. Archived from the original on 25 January 2007.

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  34. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VIII The Question Of The Presence And The Utilization Of The Soviet Armed Forces In The Light Of Hungary's International Commitments, Section D. The demand for withdrawal of Soviet armed forces, para 339 (p. 105)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

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  39. ^ a b Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA by Tim Weiner, p. 149 (2008 Penguin Books edition)

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  41. ^ Andreas, Gémes (2006). James S. Amelang, Siegfried Beer, eds. International Relations and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: a Cold War Case Study (PDF). Public Power in Europe. Studies in Historical Transformations. CLIOHRES. p. 231. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 July 2007. Retrieved 14 October 2006.CS1 maint: Uses editors parameter (link)

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  44. ^ Video (in Hungarian): The First Hours of the Revolution {{[1] director: György Ordódy, producer: Duna Televízió – Fonds 306, Audiovisual Materials Relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, OSA Archivum, Budapest, Hungary ID number: HU OSA 306-0-1:40}}

  45. ^ "SIR, – The whole body of Hungarian intel- lectuals has issued the following Manifesto:". The Spectator Archive. Retrieved 7 October 2013.

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  48. ^ a b c UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II. C (The First Shots), para 55 (p. 20) & para 464 (p. 149)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  49. ^ "A Hollow Tolerance". Time. 23 July 1965. Retrieved 23 October 2006.

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  52. ^ Gati, Charles (September 2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford University Press. p. 160. ISBN 0-8047-5606-6. Gati states: "discovered in declassified documents, the Soviet Ministry of Defense had begun to prepare for large-scale turmoil in Hungary as early as July 1956. Codenamed 'Wave', the plan called for restoration of order in less than six hours ... the Soviet Army was ready. More than 30,000 troops were dispatched to—and 6,000 reached—Budapest by the 24th, that is, in less than a day."

  53. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II.C, para 58 (p. 20)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

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  138. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter IV. E (Logistical deployment of new Soviet troops), para 181 (p. 56)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

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  144. ^ a b Lindvai, Paul (2008). One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

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  146. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VII. D (The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention), para 291 (p. 89)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  147. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VII. D (a silent carrier wave was detected until 9:45 am), para 292 (p. 89)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  148. ^ Bibó, István (1991). Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 325–27. ISBN 0-88033-214-X.

  149. ^ Bibó, István. "Nyilatkozat, 1956. November 4." [Declaration, 4 November 1956]. Válogatott tanulmányok [Assorted studies] (in Hungarian). 4, 1935–1979. ifj. István Bibó, Tibor Huszár. Retrieved 30 October 2009. in Hungarian: Magyarok! Nagy Imre miniszterelnök a ma hajnali szovjet támadáskor a szovjet követségre ment a tárgyalások folytatására, és onnan visszatérni már nem tudott. A reggel összehívott minisztertanácson a Parlament épületében tartózkodó Tildy Zoltánon kívül már csak B. Szabó István és Bibó István államminiszter tudott megérkezni. Mikor a Parlamentet a szovjet csapatok körülfogták, Tildy államminiszter a vérontás elkerülése végett megállapodást kötött velük, mely szerint ők megszállják az épületet, a benne levő polgári személyek pedig szabadon távozhatnak. Ő, a megállapodáshoz tartva magát, eltávozott. Az országgyűlés épületében egyedül alulírott Bibó István államminiszter maradtam, mint az egyedüli törvényes magyar kormány egyedüli képviselője. Ebben a helyzetben a következőket nyilatkozom: In English: To My Fellow Hungarians! When the Soviet Army attacked today at dawn, Prime Minister Nagy Imre went to the Soviet Embassy to negotiate and could not return. Tildy Zoltán, who was already in the Parliament building, and ministers Szabó István and Bibó István attended the council of ministers meeting that was convened this morning. As Soviet troops surrounded the Parliament building, minister Tildy Zoltán, to avoid bloodshed, reached an agreement, by which Soviet soldiers would occupy the Parliament building and allow all civilians to evacuate. According to this agreement, he then departed. Only the undersigned, Bibó István, remained in the Psrliament building as the only representative of the only existing legal Hungarian government. Under these circumstances, I make the following declaration: (Available in English)

  150. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VII.E, para 296 (p. 90)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  151. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VIII.B, para 596 (p. 185)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  152. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter VIII. B (The Political Background of the Second Soviet Intervention), para 600 (p. 186)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  153. ^ a b UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter V.C, para 197 (p. 61)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  154. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter V.C, para 198 (p. 61)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  155. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter V. B (The Second Soviet Military Intervention), para 200 (p. 62)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  156. ^ Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings", Journal of Contemporary HistoryVol. 33, No. 2, April 1998, p. 210.

  157. ^ Péter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom számokban", Népszabadság (Budapest), 3 November 1990

  158. ^ a b Barghoorn, Frederick. Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton University Press. 1964.

  159. ^ Pravda (Moscow), 4 November [227/228]: "Without the Slightes Delays", Moscow
    Imre Nagy turned out to be, objectively speaking, an accomplice of the reactionary forces. Imre Nagy cannot and does not want to fight the dark forces of reaction ...
    The Soviet Government, seeing that the presence of Soviet troops in Budapest might lead to further aggravation of the situation, ordered troops to leave Budapest, but ensuing events have shown that reactionary forces, taking advantage of the non-intervention of the Nagy Cabinet, have gone still further ...
    The task of barring the way to reaction in Hungary has to be carried out without the slightest delay -such is the course dictated by events ...
    Retrieved 2007-10-8 Hungarian-history.hu Archived 17 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine

  160. ^ a b George Washington University: The National Security Archive, Communiqué on the Meeting of Representatives of the Governments and the Communist and Workers' Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union (Budapest, 6 January 1957), Retrieved 7 December 2008

  161. ^ George Washington University: The National Security Archive, Minutes of the Meeting between the Hungarian and Chinese Delegations in Budapest on
    16 January 1957, Retrieved 7 December 2008

  162. ^ The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents by Csaba Békés & Malcolm Byrne (Published by Central European University Press, 2002, ISBN 963-9241-66-0, ISBN 978-963-9241-66-4, 598 pages), p. 375, para 4: "... the (Kádár) regime had to find an explanation for the revolution and collapse of the old regime in October 1956 ... they chose to interpret the uprising as a conspiracy by anti-communist, reactionary forces. This is why they labeled many ordinary citizens' actions as crimes. Critical opposition attitudes were described as "a plot to overthrow the people's democratic regime", and workers and peasants who took part in the revolt were called "jailbirds, ragamuffins, and kulaks." Armed resistance to occupying forces became "murder and wrecking state property." This kind of terminology became part of the official ideology of the regime toward the outside world." Also p. 375, footnote 40: "For a typical survey of propaganda intended for distribution abroad, see the so called "White Books" entitled The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary4 vols., (Budapest: Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, 1956–1957) ... The White Books published in the individual counties of Hungary in 1957–1958 summarized local "counter-revolutionary" events."

  163. ^ Casardi, A. (17 April 1957) Report on Hungarian Refugees. NATO

  164. ^ Fink, Carole; Frank Hadler; Tomasz Schramm (2006). 1956: European and global perspectives, Volume 1 of Global history and international studies. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag. p. 16. ISBN 3-937209-56-5.

  165. ^ Molnár, Adrienne; Kõrösi Zsuzsanna (1996). The handing down of experiences in families of the politically condemned in Communist Hungary. IX. International Oral History Conference. Gotegorg. pp. 1169–66. Retrieved 10 October 2008.

  166. ^ a b Cseresnyés, Ferenc (Summer 1999). "The '56 Exodus to Austria". The Hungarian Quarterly. Society of the Hungarian Quarterly. XL (154): 86–101. Archived from the original on 27 November 2004. Retrieved 9 October 2006.

  167. ^ Csaba Békés; Malcolm Byrne; János Rainer (2002). "Hungary in the Aftermath, Introduction". The 1956 Hungarian revolution: a history in documents. Zentraleuropäische Hochschulpresse. p. 364. ISBN 963-9241-66-0. Retrieved 31 October 2009. I call upon the Hungarian people to regard neither the occupation force nor the puppet government it may install as a legal authority but rather to employ every means of passive resistance against it ... (István Bibó minister of state of the Petőfi Party) Despite the devastation of the Soviet attack, most of Hungarian society seemed to respond to Bibó's plea and continued to defy the new regime, keeping Soviet and Hungarian security forces tied up for months dealing with strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, work slowdowns, and other acts of resistance (Document No. 102)

  168. ^ Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer (2002). Hungarian Tragedyp. L. Central European University Press: Budapest. ISBN 963-9241-66-0.

  169. ^ "Situation Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party by Malenkov-Suslov-Aristov (22 November 1956)" (PDF). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in Documents. George Washington University: The National Security Archive. 4 November 2002. Retrieved 2 September 2006.

  170. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter XIV.I.A, para 642 (p. 198), János Kádár's 15 points (4 November 1956)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  171. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Annex A (Agreement between the Hungarian People Republic and the government of the USSR on the legal status of Soviet forces) pp. 112–13)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  172. ^ International Committee of the Red Cross: ICRC action in Hungary in 1956. Retrieved 7 December 2008.

  173. ^ Fryer, Peter (1997). Hungarian Tragedyp. 10. Index Books: London. ISBN 1-871518-14-8.

  174. ^ a b "On This Day 16 June 1989: Hungary reburies fallen hero Imre Nagy" British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports on Nagy reburial with full honors. Retrieved 13 October 2006.

  175. ^ "End of a Private Cold War". Time Magazine. 11 October 1971. Retrieved 3 September 2006.

  176. ^ Johns Hopkins University Professor Charles Gati, in his book Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (see Further reading, below), agreed with a 2002 essay by Hungarian historian Csaba Bekes, "Could the Hungarian Revolution Have Been Victorious in 1956?". Gati states: "Washington implicitly acknowledging the division of the continent into two camps, understood that Moscow would not let go of a country bordering on neutral but pro-Western Austria and an independent Yugoslavia, so it shed ... tears over Soviet brutality, and exploited the propaganda opportunities ..." (p. 208)

  177. ^ "How to Help Hungary". Time Magazine. 24 December 1956. Retrieved 3 September 2006.

  178. ^ Simpson, James (1997). Simpson's Contemporary Quotations. Collins ISBN 0-06-270137-1. Archived from the original on 12 October 2007.

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  181. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter I. E (Attempts to observe in Hungary and meet Imre Nagy), paragraphs 32–34 (p. 14)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  182. ^ UN General Assembly (1957) Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. Retrieved 14 October 2006.

  183. ^ UN General Assembly Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (1957) "Chapter II. N (Summary of conclusions), paragraph 89 (pp. 30–32)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  184. ^ United Nations General Assembly, Thirteenth Session: Resolution 1312 (XIII) The Situation in Hungary (Item 59, p. 69 (12 December 1958)

  185. ^ ed. A. T. Lane. Biographical dictionary of European labor leaders. Volume 1. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995. p. 20.

  186. ^ Alsing Andersen. Gravsted.dk. Retrieved on 28 October 2016.

  187. ^ United Nations Yearbook. 1957. p. 63

  188. ^ K. Danilov "The Provocation Continues". International Affairs, No. 8, Vol. 3, 1957, pp. 54–61

  189. ^ "Freedom Fighter". Time. 7 January 1957.. Retrieved 21 September 2008.

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  195. ^ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Community Development Project. "Verbraucherpreisindex (Schätzung) 1800–". Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved January 2, 2019.

  196. ^ The following are references in English on the conflicting positions of l'UnitàAntonio Giolitti and party boss Palmiro Togliatti, Giuseppe Di Vittorio and Pietro Nenni.

  197. ^ Napolitano, Giorgio (2005). Dal Pci al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica (From the Communist Party to European Socialism. A political autobiography) (in Italian). Laterza. ISBN 88-420-7715-1.

  198. ^ Sartre, Jean-Paul (1956), L'intellectuel et les communistes français (in French) Le Web de l'Humanite, 21 June 2005. Retrieved 24 October 2006.

  199. ^ "US State Department Commemorates the 1956 Hungarian Revolution" (Press release). American Hungarian Federation. 13 February 2006. Retrieved 8 October 2006.

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Further reading[edit]



  • Bekes, Csaba; Byrne, Malcolm; Rainer, Janos (Editor), eds. (2003). The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (National Security Archive Cold War Readers). Zentraleuropäische Hochschulpresse. p. 600. ISBN 963-9241-66-0.CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link)

  • Bibó, István (1991). Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 331–54. ISBN 0-88033-214-X.

  • Gadney, Reg (October 1986). Cry Hungary: Uprising 1956. Macmillan Pub Co. pp. 169 pages. ISBN 0-689-11838-4.

  • Gati, Charles (2006). Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Cold War International History Project Series). Stanford University Press. p. 264. ISBN 0-8047-5606-6.

  • Granville, Johanna (2004). The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Texas A&M University Press. p. 323. ISBN 1-58544-298-4.

  • Granville, Johanna (1999) In the Line of Fire: New Archival Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Hungary, 1956, Carl Beck Paperno. 1307 (1999). open access publication – free to read

  • Györkei, Jenõ; Kirov, Alexandr; Horvath, Miklos (1999). Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956. New York: Central European University Press. p. 350. ISBN 963-9116-36-X.

  • Kertesz, Stephen D. (1953). Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ISBN 0-8371-7540-2. Archived from the original on 3 September 2007.

  • Korda, Michael. Journey to a Revolution: A Personal Memoir and History of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Harper Perennial (2006). ISBN 978-0-06-077262-8

  • Michener, James A. (1985). The Bridge at Andau (reissue ed.). New York: Fawcett. ISBN 0-449-21050-2.

  • Morris, William E. (August 2001). Lettis, Richard, ed. The Hungarian Revolt: 23 October–4 November 1956 (Reprint ed.). Simon Publications. ISBN 1-931313-79-2.

  • Napolitano, Giorgio (2005). Dal Pci al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica (From the Communist Party to European Socialism. A political autobiography) (in Italian). Laterza. ISBN 88-420-7715-1.

  • Péter, László (2008). Resistance, Rebellion and Revolution in Hungary and Central Europe: Commemorating 1956. London: UCL SSEES. p. 361. ISBN 978-0-903425-79-7.

  • Schmidl, Erwin A. & Ritter, László. (2006) The Hungarian Revolution, 1956; Osprey Elite series #148. ISBN 1-84603-079-X ISBN 978-1-84603-079-6

  • Sebestyen, Victor (2006). Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. New York: Pantheon. p. 340. ISBN 0-375-42458-X.

  • Sugar, Peter F. (1994). Hanak, Peter, Frank, Tibor, eds. A History of Hungary: From Liberation to Revolution (pp. 368–83). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 448. ISBN 0-253-20867-X.CS1 maint: Uses editors parameter (link)

  • United Nations: Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of HungaryGeneral Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592), New York, 1957 "(268 pages)" (PDF). (1.47 MB)

  • Ürményházi, Attila J.(2006) "The Hungarian Revolution-Uprising, Budapest 1956", National Library of Australia ISBN 0-646-45885-X, Record Id: 40312920

  • Zinner, Paul E. (1962). Revolution in Hungary. Books for Libraries Press. p. 380. ISBN 0-8369-6817-4.

  • Lendvai, Paul (2008). One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy. Princeton UP. p. 254. ISBN 978-0-691-13282-2.

  • Litván, György (1996). The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression, 1953–1963. Longman p. 221. ISBN 0-582-21505-6.

  • Cox, Terry. Hungary 1956 – forty Years on. London: F. Cass, 1997. Print.

  • Matthews, John P. C. Explosion: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. New York, NY: Hippocrene, 2007. Print.

  • Watry, David M. Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014.

External links[edit]


Historical collections[edit]


Other academic sources[edit]


Feature films[edit]


  • Freedom's Fury The 2005 documentary film depicting events surrounding the Hungarian-Soviet confrontation in the Olympic water polo tournament, now known as the "blood in the water match". Narrated by Mark Spitz, produced by Lucy Liu and Quentin Tarantino.

  • Torn from the flag Documentary film 2007. The significant global effects of the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

Commemorations[edit]















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